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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops a modified version of Hughes’ 
Salvo Model and employs it to analyze the tactical 
disposition (concentration or dispersion) of a small, but 
modern, navy whose adversary is numerically superior but 
technologically inferior. It also identifies tactical 
factors and develops insights that are critical to the 
success of small navies when fighting outnumbered. 
Quantitative results indicate that the smaller navy 
must fight dispersed and win by outscouting the enemy and 
attacking him effectively first. This requires a superior 
scouting capability, effective command, control, and 
communications (C3), and the ability to deliver sufficient 
striking power. To ensure the delivery of sufficient 
striking power, a small navy must put greater emphasis on 
offensive firepower to compensate for small force size.  
To be successful in battle, small navies must show 
initiative, and be willing to implement bold tactics. These 
attributes have been demonstrated by small, but successful, 
naval forces in the history of naval warfare. In addition, 
innovative tactical thinking can allow small navies to take 
advantage of useful tactical phenomenon like the “missile-
sump effect” and to design the most appropriate type of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Littoral navies have long been imbued with the 
tactical concept that force concentration universally 
favors the superior fleet and dispersal is the tactic of 
choice when outgunned or outnumbered. As a consequence, 
many small, littoral navies have adopted this concept as 
their fleet doctrine against numerically superior 
adversaries. However, with the advent of network centric 
warfare and the modernization of their fleets, many small 
navies are beginning to re-think their doctrines and 
tactics. One tactical question in particular that some of 
these navies are asking themselves is: how should the 
fleet’s tactical disposition be modified to reflect its 
qualitative improvements (e.g., better scouting 
effectiveness)? 
To answer the above question, the Modified Salvo 
Model, which extends Hughes’ Salvo Model by accounting for 
the effect of anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) leakers 
through a naval force’s anti-ASCM defenses, was developed 
in this thesis to analyze the tactical disposition 
(concentration or dispersion) of a small, but modern, 
littoral navy (Blue Navy) whose adversary (Orange Navy) is 
numerically superior but technologically inferior. Tactical 
factors and insights crucial to the success of the Blue 
Navy, and small navies in general, were also identified and 
developed.  
For the purpose of this thesis, the Blue Navy is 
assumed to consist of four missile frigates (FFGs) while 
the Orange Navy could deploy 12 missile corvettes. Although 
the Blue Navy is outnumbered three to one with respect to 
 xviii
numbers of ships, the Blue FFGs are superior to the Orange 
corvettes in terms of striking power, defensive power, and 
staying power. Furthermore, the Blue Navy’s maritime air 
surveillance assets provide it with a scouting 
effectiveness advantage.  
Results from the quantitative analysis using the 
Modified Salvo Model indicate that, in general, dispersal 
for stealthy surprise attack is the preferred tactic for 
Blue. The specific findings and insights are summarized in 
the following points: 
• The critical factor for Blue’s success against a 
numerically superior and concentrated Orange force 
is its ability to outscout Orange and deliver an 
effective pulse of offensive firepower onto the 
Orange combatants. The key to achieving this is 
through Blue’s maritime air surveillance (MAS) 
assets which enable it to detect and effectively 
attack Orange before Orange can do the same to Blue. 
• Insofar as the Orange Navy chooses to disperse its 
forces, Blue should do likewise so as to ensure at 
least a parity outcome in the event it fails to 
surprise Orange and both sides engage in an exchange 
of missile salvos.  
• Blue’s superior scouting capability makes it 
possible to simultaneously extend its information 
gathering network to detect all Orange forces, and 
allows dispersed Blue units to deliver a coordinated 
missile strike on Orange.  
• A precondition for Blue to disperse its forces is 
the ability of its combatants to apply sufficient 
offensive pulsed power. 
 xix
• An important prerequisite for a small navy or naval 
force to operate in a dispersed fashion is an 
effective command, control, and communications (C3) 
system. An effective C3 system allows a dispersed 
naval force to deliver a coordinated missile strike 
that is concentrated in both time and space.      
• Blue’s numerical inferiority dictates that it should 
not engage in a force-on-force missile salvo 
exchange with Orange. Instead, Blue must put 
unstinting emphasis on superior scouting to achieve 
surprise and conduct an effective attack before 
Orange can do likewise. 
• The consequence of being surprised is drastic for 
both Blue and Orange because either side has the 
potential to deliver offensive firepower in a sudden 
effective pulse.  
• Blue’s small force size precludes a distribution of 
firepower amongst a large number of combatants. To 
deliver sufficient striking power for an effective 
attack, Blue must increase the offensive power of 
its combatants while still maintaining sufficient 
defensive capability. In other words, offensive 
firepower must be emphasized to compensate for small 
force size. 
 
 Figure 1 below amply sums up the key findings of this 
thesis by illustrating the advantage of surprise, 
dispersal, and increased offensive firepower for an 




 Figure 1. The Advantage of Surprise, Dispersal, and 
 Increased Offensive Firepower for an Outnumbered Naval 
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 The results in Figure 1 are extracted from the 
quantitative analysis results presented in Chapter IV of 
this thesis. What Figure 1 shows is that if Blue 
concentrates its combatants into a single unit and engages 
in a missile salvo exchange with a massed Orange force, 
Blue will lose all (100%) of its combatants while putting 
only 54% of the Orange combatants out of action. On the 
other hand, if Blue possesses more offensive firepower, 
disperses its combatants, and uses its scouting advantage 
to achieve surprise, Blue can annihilate the entire Orange 
force while losing only half of its combatants. In short, 
surprise, dispersal, and increased offensive firepower 
allow Blue to increase its fractional exchange ratio (FER) 
almost four times.     
 
 xxi
 In addition to the quantitative analysis, a review of 
historical naval battles shows that an outnumbered navy or 
naval force must try to exploit an opponent’s vulnerability 
by surprise. This requires a combination of initiative, 
willingness to act on an estimate of enemy intentions, and 
the ability to implement bold, innovative tactics. These 
attributes were demonstrated by the Imperial Japanese Navy 
in the World War II Battle of Savo Island as well as by the 
Israeli Navy during the naval missile battles of the 1973 
Yom Kippur War. 
 Finally, innovative tactical thinking can allow small 
navies to take advantage of tactical phenomenon like the 
“missile-sump effect” to reduce a stronger adversary’s 
striking power or to design the most appropriate type of 
combat craft for their respective operating environments.  
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Many navies are beginning or have already begun the 
process of modernizing their fleets to keep up with the 
increasing demands of modern naval warfare. In particular, 
navies of many littoral states have been busily upgrading 
their fleets, especially in the areas of sensor and weapon 
technology. These littoral navies, especially those of the 
South East Asian states, have in the last thirty years or 
so, progressed from being purely coastal forces equipped 
predominantly with fast attack crafts (FACs) to being 
modern, well-rounded fleets with frigates and corvettes 
armed with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Some of 
these navies have even established an organic naval air arm 
composed of ship-borne helicopters and maritime patrol 
aircraft (MPA).  
While it is a relatively easy process to upgrade a 
navy’s hardware or to procure new vessels and weapons, it 
is much harder to develop new doctrines and tactics that 
are able to exploit the vastly improved capabilities of a 
naval force. Littoral navies have long been imbued with the 
tactical concept that force concentration universally 
favors the superior fleet and dispersal for stealthy 
surprise attack is the tactic of choice when outgunned or 
outnumbered. As a consequence, many small, littoral navies 
have adopted this concept as their fleet doctrine when they 
were equipped mainly with FACs and were prepared (in the 
unfortunate event of war) to fight outnumbered and 
outgunned. However, with their modernization process 
completed or nearing completion, and especially with the 
2 
advent of network centric warfare, many small navies are 
now beginning to re-think their doctrines and tactics. One 
tactical question in particular that some of these navies 
are now asking themselves is: should the fleet’s tactical 
deployment be modified to reflect its qualitative 
improvements? If so, how should the fleet be tactically 
disposed in order to take advantage of its improved 
scouting effectiveness and longer sensor and weapon ranges?  
The goal of this thesis is to address the above 
questions in the context of a small but technologically 
advanced navy. Specifically, this thesis seeks to address 
questions related to the tactical formation or disposition 
(force concentration or dispersion) of combatants (missile 
combatants in particular) of a littoral navy whose notional 
adversary is numerically superior but qualitatively 
inferior.      
Given that the goal of this thesis is achieved, the 
contents of this thesis will aid in such decisions as 
determining tactical dispositions and selection of tactical 
doctrine for small navies. 
 
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
 The specific objective of this thesis is to analyze 
tactical deployment alternatives for missile combatants of 
a small, but technologically advanced, littoral navy 
(herein referred to as the Blue Navy). The deployment 
alternatives will be analyzed in the context of a wartime 
scenario in which the Blue Navy is vying for sea control 
against an adversary navy (herein referred to as the Orange 
Navy) that is numerically superior but qualitatively 
inferior. The analysis will be conducted quantitatively 
3 
using a modified version of Hughes’ Salvo Model (herein 
referred to as the Modified Salvo Model). Detailed 
descriptions of both Hughes’ Salvo Model and the Modified 
Salvo Model are provided in Chapter II of this thesis.   
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 In the process of achieving the goal of this thesis, 
the following secondary but important questions must also 
be answered: 
• How does improved scouting effectiveness for the 
Blue Navy, in the form of more and better maritime 
air surveillance assets, affect the tactical 
disposition of Blue missile combatants? 
• How would the balance of firepower (offensive and 
defensive firepower) on board Blue missile 
combatants affect their tactical disposition? 
• How should the tactical disposition of Blue missile 
combatants change in response to the tactical 
disposition adopted by the Orange Navy? 
Addressing these secondary questions will help identify 
tactical factors that have a significant impact on the 
tactical disposition of Blue missile combatants.  
 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
 The objective of this thesis will be achieved in three 
major stages. 
 First, the Modified Salvo Model will be used to 
analytically compute the results of force-on-force missile 
engagements between the Blue and Orange navies. These 
4 
computations will be conducted for various combinations of 
Blue and Orange tactical dispositions.  
 Second, the effects of tactical factors that might 
affect the tactical disposition of Blue missile combatants 
will be investigated by varying relevant parameter values 
of the Modified Salvo Model.    
 Finally, the computed results from the first two 
stages will be analyzed to develop insights and identify 
significant tactical factors that will aid decisions on the 
tactical disposition of Blue missile combatants against the 
Orange Navy.  
 
E. THESIS FLOW 
 Chapter II of this thesis provides a detailed 
description of Hughes’ Salvo Model and proposes a modified 
version, the Modified Salvo Model. Both models’ parameters 
and assumptions will be explained and a suitable measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) will also be provided. 
 Chapter III describes the background scenario that 
will be used as a framework for the computations in this 
thesis. Data sets to be used as inputs to the Modified 
Salvo Model as well as scenario variations will all be 
documented. 
 Chapter IV presents the results of all computations 
and provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the 
results.  
 Chapter V provides qualitative discussions of how 
small naval forces can fight and win. 
 Chapter VI consists of a summary of the work done as 
well as the conclusions developed from this thesis. 
5 
F. METHODOLOGY 
 Analytical computations using an Excel spreadsheet 
implementation of the Modified Salvo Model will be the main 
methodology for this thesis. Results of the computations 
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II. MODIFIED SALVO MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides a description of Hughes’ Salvo 
Model as developed by Captain USN(Retired) Wayne P. Hughes, 
Jr. [Ref. 1] and proposes a modified version of it, called 
the Modified Salvo Model. Hughes’ Salvo Model represents 
missile combat between warships armed with conventional 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs). It was developed by Hughes to show the 
tactical consequences if a warship had the striking power 
to destroy one, or even more than one, similar warship with 
a single salvo.1 The Modified Salvo Model extends Hughes’ 
Salvo Model by accounting for the effect of ASCM leakers 
through a naval force’s anti-ASCM defenses. Both models’ 
equations, parameters, and assumptions are discussed in 
greater detail in the following sections. 
 
B. HUGHES’ SALVO MODEL EQUATIONS 
 The combat work achieved by a single ASCM salvo fired 
by a homogeneous force A is: 
 σ τ∆ 2 3
1
−= A Ba A b BB
b
  (1) 
and by a homogeneous force B: 
 
 σ τ∆ 2 3
1
−= B Ab B a AA
a
 (2) 
where in equation (1) 
 
 A = number of ships in force A 
                       1 A salvo is combat power which arrives at the target in a single, 
instantaneous pulse. 
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 B = number of ships in force B 
 
 ∆B = number of ships in force B out of action from A’s 
  salvo 
 
 σA = scouting effectiveness of force A 
 
 a2 = striking power of each ship in force A     
 
 τB = defensive readiness of force B 
 
 b3 = defensive power of each ship in force B 
 
 b1 = staying power of each ship in force B 
 
 The corresponding terms and terminology hold for 
equation (2).  
 The combat power of a salvo is measured in hits that 
damage the target force. The combat power per salvo of 
force A is the numerator of equation (1). Similarly, the 
numerator of equation (2) corresponds to force B’s combat 
power per salvo. Combat power achieves combat work measured 
in hits. Dividing total salvo combat power by the number of 
hits a target can take before it is out of action (staying 
power), the result is the number of enemy ships out of 
action.2  
 
C. DEFINITION OF HUGHES’ SALVO MODEL PARAMETERS 
 This section provides definitions of the Hughes’ Salvo 
Model parameters used in equations (1) and (2). The 





                     2 A warship put out of action is rendered harmless with no combat 
power remaining. It is not necessarily sunk.  
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1. Striking Power (a2, b2) 
  In the context of modern naval ship-vs-ship missile 
warfare, the striking power of a warship is the number of 
accurate ASCMs fired by it per salvo. Striking power is, 
therefore, a function of actual salvo size, missile launch 
reliability, and missile hit probability. In mathematical 
terms,  
Striking Power = (ASCM Salvo Size)*(ASCM Launch 
Reliability)*(ASCM Hit Probability) (3) 
  
 It must be noted that ASCM hit probability refers to 
the probability that an ASCM will hit a warship in the 
absence of anti-ASCM defenses.   
 
 2. Defensive Power (a3, b3)  
 Defensive power is the number of accurate ASCMs 
(within an ASCM salvo) that each defending warship can 
destroy or deflect when alert and ready to do so. The 
defensive power of a warship is therefore a function of the 
number of defensive fire control channels it has.  
 
 3. Staying Power (a1, b1) 
 The staying power of a warship is the number of 
nominal ASCM hits needed to put the warship out of action 
(OOA). Equivalently, it is the number of nominal ASCM hits 
that can be absorbed by a warship before its combat power 
is reduced to zero for the remainder of the engagement.  
 
 4. Scouting Effectiveness (σA, σB)   
 Scouting refers to the ability of a warship or naval 
force to collect all the essential and necessary 
10 
information about the enemy required to effectively attack 
it.  
 In the context of Hughes’ Salvo Model, scouting 
effectiveness is a multiplier applied to striking power and 
takes values between zero (or 0%) and one (or 100%). It 
measures the extent to which striking power is diminished 
due to less-than-perfect scouting and C2 (Command and 
Control) and hence, degraded targeting and distribution of 
fire against the opposing force. A scouting effectiveness 
value of zero means no information about the enemy and no 
ability to hit any targets. A value of one means all 
targets are within effective range and each is being 
tracked, so that every enemy ship may be fired at.  
 
 5. Defensive Readiness (τA, τB)   
 Defensive readiness is the extent to which a defending 
warship fails to take defensive actions up to its designed 
combat potential, due to a low level of alertness or 
inattention caused by faulty EMCON (Emissions Control). It 
is a multiplier of defensive power with values between zero 
(or 0%) and one (or 100%).  
 A good example of the effect of defensive readiness on 
a warship’s defensive power was provided during the recent 
(Jul-Aug 2006) conflict in the Middle East between Israel 
and Hezbollah militants in Lebanon. The INS Hanit, an 
Israeli Navy Saar V missile corvette, was hit by a C-802 
ASCM launched by a shore-based missile battery. The Hanit’s 
defensive systems (consisting of an array of anti-ASCM 
missiles and ECM systems) were not activated because of an 
IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) conflict with Israeli 
Air Force (IAF) forces operating in the area. This 
11 
effectively negated the Hanit’s considerable defensive 
power and left it defenseless against the ASCM attack.3   
 
D. HUGHES’ SALVO MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
 The essential assumptions inherent in Hughes’ Salvo 
Model are listed below. These assumptions are extracted 
from Hughes’ work [Ref. 1]. 
• Each of the two opposing naval forces consists of 
homogeneous warships equipped with identical weapons 
(ASCMs and SAMs). 
• Accurate ASCM shots are spread equally over all 
targets. Although a uniform distribution is not 
necessarily the best distribution, it must be borne 
in mind that knowledge and control were never 
adequate in past naval battles when targets were in 
plain view, and it is less likely that optimal 
distribution of fire will be achieved in the future. 
Thus, this assumption is as good as any for 
exploratory analyses. 
• Counterfire from the defensive systems of the 
targeted force (after taking into account defensive 
readiness) eliminates all accurate ASCM shots until 
the force’s defenses are saturated, after which all 
accurate ASCM shots will hit. Thus, a subtractive 
process best describes the effect of defensive 
counterfire. 
• A warship’s staying power is the number of standard 
sized or nominal ASCM hits required to put it out of 
action, not to sink it. The tactical aim is to put                      3 The information pertaining to the INS Hanit incident was sourced 
from an article (“A Military Assessment of the Lebanon Conflict”) 
written by a defense analyst named Ben Moores 
(ben.moores@btconnect.com) and circulated by Alidade Incorporated. 
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all enemy ships out of action so that none poses a 
threat, after which the helpless ships may be sunk 
without risk.       
• Hits on a target force will diminish its whole 
fighting strength linearly and proportionate to the 
remaining hits the target force can take before it 
is completely out of action. 
• Losses are measured in warships put out of action. 
 
E. MODIFIED SALVO MODEL EQUATIONS AND ALGORITHM 
 The Modified Salvo Model attempts to inject more 
realism into Hughes’ Salvo Model by accounting for the fact 
that anti-ASCM defenses are not perfect and a certain 
proportion of accurate ASCMs within a salvo will be able to 
“leak through” the anti-ASCM defenses of a naval force. 
 
 1. Equations for Striking Power 
 Equations (4) and (5) apply to an attacking naval 
force B. 
 
 2 ( Rel Hitb ASCM Salvo Size)*(ASCM )*(ASCM P )=  (4) 
 2 * *B BStrike b B σ=  (5) 
where 
 b2 = striking power of each ship in force B 
 
 ASCM Salvo Size = ASCM salvo size of each ship  
 
 ASCMRel = ASCM launch reliability 
 
 ASCM PHit = ASCM hit probability in the absence of  
    anti-ASCM defenses 
  
 StrikeB = total striking power of force B 
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 B = number of ships (missile combatants) in force B 
 
 σB = scouting effectiveness of force B 
 
 2. Equation for Defensive Power 
 Equation (6) applies to a defending naval force A. 
 3 * *A ADefense a Aτ=  (6) 
where 
 DefenseA = total defensive power of force A 
 
 a3 = defensive power of each ship in force A  
 
 τA = defensive readiness of force A 
 
 A = number of ships (missile combatants) in force A 
 
 3. Algorithm for Combat Power 
 The following algorithm computes the combat power per 
ASCM salvo of an attacking naval force B against a 
defending naval force A when ASCM “leakers” are accounted 
for.   
 
 IF StrikeB > DefenseA, 
  CombatB = (StrikeB-DefenseA)+(1-ASCMDA)*DefenseA 
 ELSE IF StrikeB <= DefenseA, 
  CombatB = (1-ASCMDA)* StrikeB 
where  
 CombatB = force B’s combat power per ASCM salvo  
 ASCMDA = anti-ship cruise missile defense effectiveness 
      of force A. This is the probability that the  
          anti-ASCM defenses of force A will defeat a  





 4. Equation for Number of Ships Put Out of Action 
 The number of ships in force A put out of action by 






∆ =  (7) 
where 
 ∆A = number of ships in force A put out of action by  
  force B’s ASCM salvo   
 a1 = staying power of each ship in force A 
  
 The definitions and explanations of combat power, 
striking power, defensive power, staying power, scouting 
effectiveness, and defensive readiness are as stated in 
sections B and C of this chapter. 
 The calculation of ∆B is symmetrical with notation for 
sides A and B reversed. The Modified Salvo Model equations 
and algorithm documented in this section can therefore be 
applied to a missile salvo exchange between any two naval 
forces.  
 The assumptions inherent in the Modified Salvo Model 
are similar to those for Hughes’ Salvo Model stated in 
section D of this chapter. The major exception is that the 
Modified Salvo Model assumes that a certain proportion of 
accurate or well-aimed ASCMs within a salvo will always 
“leak through” a naval force’s anti-ASCM defenses. 
  
F. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS: FRACTIONAL EXCHANGE RATIO  
 A suitable measure of effectiveness (MOE) that can be 
computed using the Modified Salvo Model is the fractional 
exchange ratio (FER). The FER compares the fraction of two 
forces destroyed by each other under the supposition that 
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they simultaneously exchange salvos. Using the same terms 
as used in the preceding section, the fraction of each 
force that can be put out of action by a salvo is given by 












∆ =  (9) 
 
 Equation (9) is divided by equation (8) to obtain the 







 When the FER is greater than one, force A has reduced 
force B by a greater fraction than force B has reduced 
force A and so if ∆A<A force A has won in the sense that it 
will have surviving warships when force B is eliminated (in 
subsequent simultaneous salvos). When the FER is less than 
one, force B has the advantage of the exchange. Parity is 
achieved when the FER is equal to one. 
 For this thesis, the FER is used as the MOE for force-
on-force salvo exchange computations using the Modified 
Salvo Model as it provides a comparative effectiveness of 
two naval forces engaged in a missile salvo exchange. 
 
G. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
 The equations and algorithm of the Modified Salvo 
Model are implemented as an Excel spreadsheet model. The 
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model inputs are the Modified Salvo Model parameters as 
listed in section E of this chapter. The fraction of each 
force put out of action (expressed as a percentage) and the 
fractional exchange ratio (FER) are the main model outputs 
generated. 
 


















III. BACKGROUND SCENARIO, DATA SETS, AND SCENARIO 
VARIATIONS 
This chapter provides a description of the background 
scenario used as a basis for the computations in this 
thesis. The data sets used as inputs to the Modified Salvo 
Model and the scenario variations are also presented.   
 
A. BACKGROUND SCENARIO 
 The background scenario for this thesis is a maritime 
conflict in which a littoral state (Blue) is involved in a 
territorial dispute with its larger neighbor state (Orange) 
over a strategically located island accessible to maritime 
traffic from both states. The dispute has escalated into a 
shooting war between the two states and the Orange Navy has 
sortied its major naval combatants in an effort to acquire 
sea control over the sea lanes around the disputed island. 
The Blue Navy, being numerically inferior but 
technologically more advanced, has decided to challenge the 
Orange Navy and has also dispatched all its naval 
combatants to engage the Orange naval task force. 
 The Orange task force (TF) consists of 12 missile 
corvettes while the Blue TF is made up of four modern 
missile frigates. Although the Blue TF is outnumbered three 
to one with respect to numbers of ships, the Blue frigates 
are superior to the Orange corvettes in terms of striking 
power, defensive power, and staying power. Furthermore, the 
Blue Navy has invested heavily in maritime air surveillance 




over the Orange Navy. The data pertaining to the attributes 
of the Blue and Orange combatants are presented in the next 
section.       
 The Orange TF commander (CTF) has the option of 
concentrating all his 12 corvettes in a single TF in the 
vicinity of the disputed island or splitting them into two 
dispersed task groups (TGs) of equal size to control both 
sea approaches to the disputed island. Similarly, the Blue 
CTF can choose to either concentrate or disperse his 
forces. The possible combinations of both forces’ tactical 
dispositions are summarized in section C of this chapter. 
 
B. DATA SETS 
 The attributes of the Blue and Orange combatants are 
summarized in Table 1 below. These attributes are used as 
model inputs for the Modified Salvo Model computations. 
 
  Table 1.  Attributes of Naval Combatants 
Attribute Blue Combatant Orange Combatant 





















 It is assumed that the ASCM salvo size of each 
combatant is equivalent to the ASCM load carried since it 
is not unreasonable for a naval combatant to launch all its 




 As stated in section C of Chapter II, the defensive 
power of a combatant is a function of the number of 
defensive fire control channels it has. The number of SAMs 
each combatant is capable of carrying is actually larger 
than its stated defensive power.    
 Blue FFGs are modular and can be equipped with either 
one of the following two offensive/defensive configurations 
displayed in Table 2.   
 
 Table 2. Blue FFG Offensive/Defensive Configurations 
Configuration ASCM Salvo Size Defensive Power 
a 8 6 
b 12 4 
 
 1. Derivation of Staying Power  
 The respective staying powers (per combatant) of the 
Blue and Orange combatants displayed in Table 1 are derived 
from a relationship proposed by the Brookings Institution 
and re-stated in Ref. 2. The relationship proposed by the 
Brookings Institution asserts that the number of hits 
required to put a ship out of action can be related to the 
length of the ship. A similar relationship was reached by 
Beall [Ref. 3] when he concluded that ship vulnerability is 
proportional to the cube root of ship displacement. Since 
displacement is roughly proportional to the three 
dimensions of length, beam, and draft, the cube root 
reduces to the dominant dimension, which is the length 
[Ref. 2].  
 The Brookings study further concluded that a hit by 
one large warhead would incapacitate a modern warship up to 
300 feet long, and another similar warhead is required for 
every additional 100 feet [Ref. 2].  
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 Assuming that the length of each Blue FFG is 
approximately 350 feet (which is typical of modern FFGs 
used by many coastal navies) and each Orange missile 
corvette is approximately 300 feet long (again typical of 
the larger missile corvettes used by many coastal navies), 
and applying the conclusion of the Brookings study stated 
in the preceding paragraph, it can easily be seen that the 
staying power of each Blue and Orange combatant (with 
respect to the number of generic ASCM hits) are 1.5 and 1, 
respectively.        
 Using the relationship and conclusion from the 
Brookings study, it is also possible to develop a “back of 
the envelope” model for computing ship staying power with 
respect to the number of hits from an ASCM of a particular 
warhead weight. This work is presented in Appendix A.    
 
 2. Weapon Effectiveness 
 Generic weapon effectiveness data obtained from 
analyses of actual naval missile engagements [Ref. 2] are 
also used in the Modified Salvo Model computations. These 
data apply to both Blue and Orange combatants and are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 





















 ASCM launch reliability is the probability that an 
ASCM is successfully launched. The ASCM hit probability 
refers to the probability that an ASCM will hit a warship 
in the absence of anti-ASCM defenses and anti-ship cruise 
missile defense (ASCMD) effectiveness refers to defender 
effectiveness in defeating well-aimed ASCMs.   
 
C. SCENARIO VARIATIONS 
 Four possible combinations of Blue and Orange tactical 
dispositions are considered in this thesis and each 
combination forms a scenario variation. These four scenario 
variations are summarized in Table 4 below.  
 
   Table 4. Scenario Variations 




A Concentration: all 
4 FFGs in one Task 
Force (TF) for 
massed attack on 
Orange TF 
Concentration: all 
12 corvettes in 
one TF  
B Dispersion: 2 Task 
Groups (TGs) with 
2 FFGs each for 
dispersed & 
simultaneous 
attack on Orange 
TF 
Concentration: all 
12 corvettes in 
one TF  
C Concentration: all 
4 FFGs in one TF.  
Blue TF will 
attack Orange TGs 
sequentially. 
Dispersion: 2 TGs 
with 6 corvettes 
each    
D Dispersion: 2 TGs 
with 2 FFGs each. 
Each Blue TG will 
attack 1 Orange 
TG. 
Dispersion: 2 TGs 
with 6 corvettes 
each   
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 Each scenario variation is explained in greater detail 
in Chapter IV together with the analytical process and 
computed results.  








IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The aim of this chapter is to present the computed 
results and analysis for all scenario variations in  
Table 4. All results were computed using a spreadsheet 
implementation of the Modified Salvo Model.  
 
A. ORGANIZATION OF RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 The following section provides an overview and 
discussion of the assumptions that are generic to all 
scenario variations. The scenario description, specific 
scenario assumptions, tables of numerical results (bar 
charts are presented in Appendix B), analysis, and key 
insights for each of the four scenario variations are 
presented in separate sections (sections C, D, E and F). 
Section G summarizes the important findings and highlights 
significant factors and insights derived from the analyses 
of the individual scenario variations. 
 
B. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS    
A basic, but important, assumption for this thesis is 
that the Blue Navy, though numerically inferior, is 
technologically more advanced than the Orange Navy. The 
Blue Navy’s technological superiority is manifested in its 
maritime air surveillance capabilities. In particular, the 
Blue Navy possesses long-range, long-endurance maritime 
patrol aircraft (MPA) operating from land bases as well as 
naval helicopters organic to the Blue FFGs. These maritime 
aircraft, though unarmed, provide the Blue Navy with a 
significant scouting and, therefore, targeting advantage 
over the Orange Navy. The Orange Navy, on the other hand, 
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does not possess any maritime air surveillance assets and 
has to depend on its shipboard sensors for scouting and 
targeting. It is also assumed that the land-based strike 
aircraft of both sides’ air forces are not assigned to an 
anti-shipping role because the combat aircraft of both air 
forces are fully utilized in the ongoing air campaign.  
On a one-to-one basis, each Blue FFG has greater 
striking power, defensive power, and staying power than an 
Orange missile corvette (refer to Table 1 for attributes of 
Blue and Orange naval combatants). It must be noted, 
however, that it is assumed that both Blue and Orange naval 
combatants employ the same types of offensive (ASCM) and 
defensive (ASCMD) weapons since both Blue and Orange navies 
acquire shipboard weapons from the same international 
supplier. As a result, both navies have similar weapons 
effectiveness (refer to Table 3 for weapon effectiveness 
data).  
The assumptions stated in the preceding two paragraphs 
lead to the following important tactical assumptions: 
• Blue has a significant sensor range advantage over 
Orange as a consequence of Blue’s possession of 
maritime air surveillance assets.  
• Blue and Orange ASCM effective ranges are equivalent 
since they use the same type of ASCM. 
• The sensor coverage provided by Blue maritime air 
surveillance assets exceeds Blue’s ASCM effective 
range. Hence, upon detection of Orange naval 
combatants by Blue air surveillance assets, Blue 
FFGs are required to close in to ASCM effective 
range in order to launch an effective attack. 
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 An additional assumption is that the shipboard sensors 
on board Orange missile corvettes are able to detect Blue 
FFGs when they are within ASCM effective range. This 
implies that the Blue and Orange naval combatants are 
capable of engaging in an ASCM salvo exchange if the 
respective combatants are within ASCM effective range of 
each other. This assumption is necessary for carrying out 
the force-on-force engagement computations using the 
Modified Salvo Model.  
 All the above assumptions apply to all scenario 
variations.      
 
C. SCENARIO VARIATION A  
 Scenario Variation A is a classic fleet versus fleet 
force-on-force engagement scenario. Both Blue and Orange 
navies concentrate their respective missile combatants into 
a single Task Force (TF) with the expectation of engaging 
the enemy in a head-to-head missile salvo exchange. This 
scenario variation is broken up into the following three 
excursions or sub-scenarios: 
• Excursion A1: Blue manages to detect and target the 
Orange TF without itself being detected. Blue, in 
other words, manages to achieve tactical surprise 
over Orange. The Orange TF, on the other hand, is 
unable to launch a reply ASCM salvo since it has not 
detected the Blue TF and only manages to defend 
itself against the Blue ASCMs. This is the best-case 
scenario for Blue within the context of Scenario 
Variation A. The Modified Salvo Model parameter for 
Blue’s scouting effectiveness is varied for each 
Blue offensive/defensive configuration and the 
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resulting percentages of Orange combatants put out 
of action are computed. (In this case, since Orange 
is unable to launch a reply ASCM salvo, the 
percentage of Orange combatants put out of action by 
Blue’s ASCM salvo is a more appropriate measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) than the Fractional Exchange 
Ratio (FER)). The defensive readiness parameter for 
Orange is fixed at 100% for all computations since 
it is assumed that the Orange TF’s anti-ASCM 
defenses are up and ready all the time and, 
therefore, capable of detecting and countering the 
incoming Blue ASCMs.       
• Excursion A2: This is similar to Excursion A1 except 
that the roles are reversed. In other words, Blue is 
now surprised by Orange. This is the worst-case 
scenario for Blue within the context of Scenario 
Variation A. The purpose of this excursion is to 
explore the possibility that despite Blue’s superior 
maritime air surveillance capabilities, it could 
still be surprised by Orange. For example, the 
Orange missile corvettes could possibly delay or 
even avoid detection by Blue maritime surveillance 
aircraft by mingling with and ‘hugging’ merchant 
ships sailing along the sea lanes in the vicinity of 
the disputed island.    
• Excursion A3: For this excursion, neither side 
achieves surprise and both sides exchange ASCM 
salvos. This is the case in which the Orange TF 
manages to detect the Blue TF and launches a reply 
ASCM salvo before the Blue ASCM salvo arrives at the 
Orange TF’s location. The scouting effectiveness for 
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Orange is varied for each Blue offensive/defensive 
configuration and the FER for Blue computed. Blue’s 
scouting effectiveness and both sides’ defensive 
readiness are fixed at 100%.  
 
 1. Results for Excursion A1 
 





ASCM Salvo Size = 
8
Defensive Power = 
6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 
12
















   
 Blue’s scouting effectiveness is varied as a form of 
sensitivity analysis and to account for cases in which 
Blue’s striking power is diminished due to deficient 
targeting data (e.g., degradation of datalink between Blue 
maritime air surveillance aircraft and Blue FFGs).  
 With an offensive salvo size of eight ASCMs per FFG 
(Blue offensive/defensive configuration (a)), and with 
perfect scouting effectiveness, the Blue TF can at most put 
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about 54% of the total of 12 Orange combatants out of 
action (OOA). An increase in ASCM salvo size for Blue from 
eight to twelve ASCMs per salvo per FFG will allow Blue to 
put all Orange combatants out of action if perfect scouting 
effectiveness can be achieved. In summary, for any level of 
Blue scouting effectiveness, the 50% increase in ASCM salvo 
size provided by offensive/defensive configuration (b) 
allows Blue, if it can achieve tactical surprise, to put a 
greater percentage of Orange combatants out of action. 
Blue’s defensive power does not play a role in this 
excursion since Orange is unable to apply its offensive 
firepower.  
 
 2. Results for Excursion A2  
    





ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
















 If the Orange TF can achieve tactical surprise, it 
could suffer up to a 30% degradation in scouting 
effectiveness and still put the entire Blue TF out of 
action. This applies regardless of whether Blue adopts 
offensive/defensive configuration (a) or (b). The main 
reason for this is that the relatively large number of 
Orange combatants (12 missile corvettes) allows the Orange 
TF to apply sufficient striking power to overwhelm the Blue 
TF’s anti-ASCM defenses and put every Blue FFG out of 
action. Blue must, therefore, use its superior maritime air 
surveillance capability to avoid a surprise attack by 
Orange.    
   
 3. Results for Excursion A3 
  





ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12













MOE: FER for Blue 
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 With an ASCM salvo size of eight ASCMs per FFG 
(offensive/defensive configuration (a)), Blue has to 
maintain at least a 70% scouting effectiveness advantage 
over Orange (100% Blue scouting effectiveness versus <=30% 
Orange scouting effectiveness) in order to win a missile 
salvo exchange (FER for Blue >1). Otherwise, Blue loses the 
salvo exchange (FER for Blue <1). Offensive/defensive 
configuration (a) allows Blue to put only about 54% of the 
12 Orange combatants out of action (OOA). On the other 
hand, Orange is capable of putting all four Blue combatants 
OOA as long as it has a scouting effectiveness of at least 
70%. This explains why the FER for Blue (with 
offensive/defensive configuration (a)) remains constant at 
0.54 for levels of Orange scouting effectiveness >=70%. 
 If Blue adopts offensive/defensive configuration (b) 
and therefore increases its ASCM salvo size by 50%, it will 
either win the salvo exchange (FER for Blue >1) or achieve 
parity (FER for Blue = 1). This result holds as long as 
Blue has 100% scouting effectiveness while that for Orange 
is less than or equal to 100%. With this 50% increase in 
ASCM salvo size, Blue is capable of putting all Orange 
combatants OOA. Orange is capable of doing likewise to Blue 
if its scouting effectiveness is at least 60%. Hence, Blue 
(with offensive/defensive configuration (b)) achieves only 
parity (FER for Blue = 1) if its scouting effectiveness 
advantage over Orange does not exceed 40% (100% Blue 
scouting effectiveness versus >=60% Orange scouting 
effectiveness).     
 Given that Blue has perfect (100%) scouting 
effectiveness, the results indicate that it should achieve 
a significantly better FER for any level of Orange scouting 
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effectiveness less than or equal to 100% if it has greater 
offensive firepower provided by offensive/defensive 
configuration (b). This implies that Blue should put 
greater emphasis on its offensive firepower and thus 
striking power in order to overcome its inferiority in 
number of combatants.   
 
 4. Key Insights from Results of Scenario Variation A  
 If both navies concentrate their respective missile 
combatants into a massed Task Force (TF), the Blue TF, 
though outnumbered three to one in number of combatants, 
can still defeat the Orange TF if it:  
• Achieves tactical surprise, while at the same time 
avoiding a surprise attack, by using its superior 
scouting capability provided by its maritime air 
surveillance assets; 
• Possesses sufficient striking power to overcome its 
numerical inferiority.  
 
D. SCENARIO VARIATION B 
 In this scenario variation, the Orange tactical 
disposition is similar to that in Scenario Variation A in 
that all twelve Orange combatants are concentrated in a 
single Task Force (TF). Blue, on the other hand, has 
dispersed its TF into two separate Task Groups (TGs), with 
each TG consisting of two FFGs.  
 The two excursions of Scenario Variation B are 
discussed below. 
• Excursion B1: The key assumption of this excursion 
is that Blue’s superior maritime air surveillance 
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capability allows it to detect the entire Orange TF 
and provide targeting data to the two Blue TGs 
(perfect or 100% Blue scouting effectiveness) before 
they can be detected by Orange. However, since it is 
assumed that both sides have equivalent ASCM 
effective ranges, it is still necessary for the Blue 
TGs to come within the Orange TF’s ASCM effective 
range (and detection range) before they can 
effectively launch their attack. In order to prevent 
the Orange TF from being aware of the presence of 
both Blue TGs, only one Blue TG will radiate active 
sensors. This “active” Blue TG will be used as 
“bait” to draw the Orange TF’s attention. The 
“silent” Blue TG, on the other hand, will use the 
targeting data provided by the Blue maritime 
surveillance aircraft to position itself for a 
surprise ASCM strike on the Orange TF. It will 
attempt to mingle with and “hug” any neutral vessels 
to further avoid detection by the Orange TF. In 
short, both Blue TGs will launch a simultaneous ASCM 
attack on the Orange TF while the Orange TF, being 
unaware of the “silent” Blue TG, can only engage the 
“active” Blue TG. The defensive readiness for both 
Blue and Orange are set to 100% since it is assumed 
that both sides’ anti-ASCM defenses are alert and 
ready at all times. Orange’s scouting effectiveness 
is varied for each Blue offensive/defensive 
configuration and the FER for Blue computed.  
• Excursion B2: Excursion B2 serves to illustrate the 
importance of achieving tactical surprise for either 
side. For the purpose of illustration, it is assumed 
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that Orange has superior scouting capabilities and 
manages to launch a pre-emptive strike against the 
“active” Blue TG which only manages to defend 
itself. The Orange TF is also aware of the position 
of the “silent” Blue TG and engages it 
simultaneously in a missile salvo exchange. In other 
words, the tables are now turned on Blue. The 
scouting effectiveness of the “silent” Blue TG and 
the Orange TF as well as both sides’ defensive 
readiness are all set to 100%. The FER for Blue is 
computed for both Blue offensive/defensive 
configurations.        
 
 1. Results for Excursion B1 
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The Blue tactic in Excursion B1 allows the “silent” 
Blue TG (50% of the entire Blue force of four FFGs) to 
remain undetected by the Orange TF. This ensures that at 
least half of the Blue force will survive the engagement. 
Blue can effectively concentrate all its offensive 
firepower from both TGs on all combatants in the Orange TF,  
but Orange can only concentrate its firepower on 50% of the 
Blue force (the “active” Blue TG). Blue’s maritime air 
surveillance (MAS) capability plays a critical role since 
it allows Blue to detect all Orange combatants while Orange 
is denied this advantage due to its lack of MAS assets.  
The effectiveness of Blue’s tactic can be clearly seen 
in the results displayed in Table 8 above. Blue always wins 
(FER for Blue >1) regardless of its offensive/defensive 
configuration and the level of Orange’s scouting 
effectiveness. It can again be seen that, in general, the 
greater amount of offensive firepower provided by 
offensive/defensive configuration (b) allows Blue to 
achieve a significantly better FER.  
With offensive/defensive configuration (a), Blue 
achieves a FER of 1.08 for any level of Orange scouting 
effectiveness >=40%. This is because both Blue TGs 
(“active” and “silent”) can put about 54% of the Orange 
combatants out of action (OOA) while Orange, with a 
scouting effectiveness of between 40% and 100%, can only 
put the “active” Blue TG (50% of the total Blue force) OOA.  
With the 50% increase in ASCM salvo size provided by 
offensive/defensive configuration (b), Blue can put the 
entire Orange TF OOA while Orange, with a scouting 
effectiveness of between 30% and 100%, can still put only 
the “active” Blue TG (50% of the entire Blue force) OOA. 
35 
This is why Blue (with offensive/defensive  
configuration (b)) achieves an FER of 2.00 for any level of 
Orange scouting effectiveness >=30%.  
 
 2. Results for Excursion B2 
 
     Table 9. Excursion B2 Results 
Blue Config (a):
ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12









   
 In Table 9 above, the results for “Blue Surprises 
Orange” were extracted from the last row of Table 8 (where 
Orange Scouting Effectiveness = 100%).  
 It is clear from Table 9 that if Blue loses the 
advantage of surprise to Orange its FER drops drastically 
to the extent that it loses the engagement (FER for Blue 
<1), regardless of its offensive/defensive configuration. 
This amply demonstrates the importance of achieving 
surprise, particularly for a numerically inferior force, in 
modern naval missile salvo warfare.  
 
 3. Key Insights from Results of Scenario Variation B 
 By means of superior scouting provided by its maritime 
air surveillance capability, and consequently its 
achievement of tactical surprise, the numerically inferior 
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Blue force is able to concentrate sufficient striking power 
from its two dispersed TGs to defeat the much larger massed 
Orange force. In summary, the following factors are 
critical for an outnumbered naval force to achieve success 
against its opponent: 
• Superior scouting capability; 
• Achieve tactical surprise and avoid being surprised; 
• Possess sufficient striking power to offset own 
numerical inferiority as well as the ability to 
effectively concentrate striking power from 
dispersed forces if required;  
• Use innovative tactics (Blue’s use of dispersed 
“active” and “silent” TGs in this case) and be 
willing to take risks (use of “active” Blue TG as 
“bait”).  
 
E. SCENARIO VARIATION C 
The tactical dispositions of both sides in Scenario 
Variation C are the reverse of that in Scenario Variation 
B. Hence, in Scenario Variation C Blue operates with all 
four FFGs concentrated in a single TF while the Orange 
combatants are dispersed into two TGs with six missile 
corvettes each. There are two excursions in this scenario 
variation and they are discussed below. 
• Excursion C1: This excursion provides a worst-case 
scenario for Blue in the sense that its superior 
scouting advantage has been mitigated by Orange’s 
tactic of mingling its missile corvettes among 
merchant shipping traffic to delay detection by Blue 
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maritime surveillance aircraft. As a consequence, 
Blue is unable to achieve surprise and has to 
contend with a missile salvo exchange with each of 
the two Orange TGs. Each of the two Orange TGs is 
operating along one of the sea approaches to the 
disputed island and their distance apart precludes 
them from mutually supporting each other. Blue’s 
course of action is to take advantage of this and 
engage the Orange TGs sequentially. However, Blue 
does not have ammunition replenishment ships to re-
supply its FFGs with ASCMs. Neither can Blue sail 
back to its main naval base for reloading of 
expended ASCMs since this would leave the second 
Orange TG unchallenged for a significant amount of 
time. Hence, the main problem for Blue is whether it 
would have enough surviving FFGs and offensive 
firepower to take on the second Orange TG after its 
salvo exchange with the first Orange TG. The purpose 
of this excursion is, therefore, to compute the 
number of Blue FFGs that would be put out of action 
in a salvo exchange with the first Orange TG. The 
number of Blue ASCMs launched per FFG against the 
first Orange TG is varied for both Blue 
offensive/defensive configurations. Since both sides 
are fighting on an equal footing, the scouting 
effectiveness and defensive readiness for both sides 
are set to 100%. It will be determined from the 
computed results whether Blue has adequate surviving 
resources for a salvo exchange with the second 
Orange TG.  
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• Excursion C2: In this excursion, Blue is able to use 
its maritime air surveillance assets to help achieve 
surprise against the first Orange TG, which only 
manages to defend itself from Blue’s ASCMs. However, 
Blue still has to engage the second Orange TG in a 
missile salvo exchange since the second Orange TG 
has been informed by the first Orange TG of Blue’s 
presence and location. Furthermore, as in Excursion 
C1, Blue is still constrained by the lack of missile 
(ASCM) replenishment ships and is unable to sail 
back to base to reload with ASCMs. On the other 
hand, due to its ability to surprise the first 
Orange TG, the Blue TF should still be intact and 
possess sufficient offensive firepower to engage the 
second Orange TG. For this excursion, Blue’s 
scouting effectiveness and the defensive readiness 
for both sides are fixed at 100%. The scouting 
effectiveness of the second Orange TG is varied for 
both Blue offensive/defensive configurations and the 
FER for Blue (after engaging both Orange TGs) 
computed.         











 1. Results for Excursion C1 
 
Table 10. Excursion C1 Results for Blue Offensive/Defensive 
Configuration (a) 
 
# of Blue ASCMs 
Launched per FFG
# of Blue FFGs 
OOA










8 3.23 6.00  
 
Table 11. Excursion C1 Results for Blue Offensive/Defensive 
Configuration (b) 
 
# of Blue ASCMs 
Launched per FFG
# of Blue FFGs 
OOA














12 3.23 6.00  
 
 Tables 10 and 11 above show the results of the missile 
salvo exchange between the Blue TF and the first Orange TG 
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for Blue offensive/defensive configurations (a) and (b), 
respectively. Clearly, from both tables, all six missile 
corvettes in the first Orange TG can be put out of action 
(OOA) if each of the four Blue FFGs launches a salvo of six 
ASCMs. Any more ASCMs launched by Blue would still result 
in six Orange missile corvettes OOA. Blue suffers a loss of 
3.23 FFGs put OOA by the first Orange TG’s salvo.   
 To sum up, regardless of Blue’s offensive/defensive 
configuration, each Blue FFG has to launch six ASCMs to put 
all six missile corvettes in the first Orange TG OOA and 
only 0.77 Blue FFG would survive the salvo exchange. Hence, 
Blue would neither have adequate combatants nor offensive 
firepower for the subsequent salvo exchange with another 
six fully-armed missile corvettes in the second Orange TG. 
This implies that Blue cannot tolerate an exchange of 
missiles with both Orange TGs.   
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2. Results for Excursion C2  
   




ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
















 The results of this excursion are generally more 
favorable to Blue, the reason being that Blue is able to 
surprise and put all six combatants in the first Orange TG 
out of action (OOA). In doing so, Blue expends six ASCMs 
per FFG and suffers no loss in combatants. However, only 
offensive/defensive configuration (b) provides Blue with 
sufficient remaining striking power for an effective 
missile salvo exchange with the second Orange TG. This can 
clearly be seen in the results: if Blue adopts 
offensive/defensive configuration (b), it always wins (FER 
for Blue >1), regardless of the level of Orange’s scouting 
effectiveness. On the other hand, if Blue adopts 
offensive/defensive configuration (a), it needs at least a 
30% scouting effectiveness advantage in order to win. 
Furthermore, for any level of Orange scouting 
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effectiveness, Blue would achieve a better FER if it adopts 
offensive/defensive configuration (b) instead of 
offensive/defensive configuration (a).      
 
3. Key Insights from Results of Scenario Variation C 
It is obviously unwise for the numerically inferior 
Blue force to engage the two dispersed Orange TGs in 
sequential head-to-head missile salvo exchanges. On the 
other hand, Blue could overcome the odds against it and win 
through a combination of surprise and sufficient striking 
power.    
 
F. SCENARIO VARIATION D 
In this final scenario variation, both Blue and Orange 
disperse their respective forces into two equal strength 
TGs. In other words, the Blue force is split into two 
dispersed TGs with two FFGs each, while each Orange TG 
consists of six missile corvettes. As in the preceding 
scenario variation, the two Orange TGs are dispersed such 
that they are unable to support each other. The following 
is a description of the two excursions considered in this 
scenario variation.  
• Excursion D1: Each Blue TG is assigned to search for 
and engage one Orange TG. This implies that the Blue 
TGs are also unable to support each other due to the 
large distance between the Orange TGs. Furthermore, 
Orange merges its combatants amongst merchant 
shipping traffic so as to delay detection by Blue 
maritime surveillance aircraft and thus negate 
Blue’s superior scouting advantage (similar to 
Excursion C1). Hence, Blue is unable to use its air 
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surveillance advantage to achieve surprise and, as a 
result, each Blue TG has to engage in a missile 
salvo exchange with an Orange TG. Both sides’ 
defensive readiness as well as Blue’s scouting 
effectiveness are fixed at 100%. The overall FER for 
Blue is then computed for both Blue 
offensive/defensive configurations and for various 
levels of Orange scouting effectiveness.  
• Excursion D2: The main difference between Excursion 
D2 and D1 is that, in Excursion D2, Blue manages to 
achieve surprise against one Orange TG, which is 
only able to defend itself against Blue’s ASCMs. 
This could be due to a lack of merchant shipping 
traffic for the combatants of the surprised Orange 
TG to hide amongst. The objective of this excursion 
is to investigate the effect on the battle outcome 
for Blue if it effectively surprises half (one TG) 













 1. Results for Excursion D1    
      




ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
















 The results in Table 13 clearly indicate that the key 
factor that enables Blue to achieve parity (FER for Blue = 
1) or win a salvo exchange (FER for Blue >1) is to possess 
sufficient offensive firepower provided by 
offensive/defensive configuration (b). If Blue has 
insufficient offensive firepower (as in offensive/defensive 
configuration (a)), it can win a salvo exchange only if 
Orange’s scouting effectiveness is somehow degraded by at 
least 70%.     
 With offensive/defensive configuration (a), Blue can 
put about 54% of the total Orange force out of action 
(OOA), but loses all four FFGs if Orange scouting 
effectiveness is >=70%. Therefore, Blue’s FER remains 
constant at 0.54 for levels of Orange scouting 
effectiveness >=70%.  
45 
 With offensive/defensive configuration (b), Blue puts 
all 12 Orange combatants OOA but still loses all four FFGs 
if Orange scouting effectiveness is >=60%. This explains 
the parity result for Blue (FER for Blue = 1) if Orange 
scouting effectiveness is >=60%. 
 
 2. Results for Excursion D2 
 




ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12













MOE: FER for Blue 
 
  
 With offensive/defensive configuration (a), Blue 
manages to put about 54% of the total of 12 Orange 
combatants out of action (OOA) and loses only two FFGs (50% 
of the total Blue force) when Orange scouting effectiveness 
is >=70%. The two surviving Blue FFGs are those that 
achieved surprise. Hence, Blue achieves an FER of 1.08 for 
Orange scouting effectiveness >=70%. 
 The 50% increase in ASCM salvo size provided by 
offensive/defensive configuration (b) allows Blue to put 
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all 12 Orange combatants OOA. In this case, Blue loses only 
two FFGs (50% of the total Blue force) and achieves an FER 
of 2.00 when Orange scouting effectiveness is >=60%. The 
two surviving Blue FFGs are also those that achieved 
surprise.  
 A comparison of the results of excursions D1 and D2 
shows the advantage of achieving surprise for the Blue 
force, even though surprise is achieved only against one of 
the two Orange TGs. If Blue manages to surprise just one 
Orange TG, it will win the battle (FER for Blue >1) 
regardless of its offensive/defensive configuration and the 
level of Orange’s scouting effectiveness. In addition, 
having greater offensive firepower (offensive/defensive 
configuration (b)) and thus greater striking power will 
generally enable Blue to achieve a better FER.  
   
3. Key Insights from Results of Scenario Variation D  
As in Scenario Variation C, achieving surprise and 
possessing sufficient striking power for an effective 
attack are the two key factors for ensuring Blue’s success 
against the numerically superior Orange force.  
From the results in Tables 13 and 14, it can be seen 
that the FER for Blue is generally doubled if it is able to 
surprise one Orange TG. The significance of achieving 







Table 15. The Significance of Achieving Surprise for Blue 
        
Orange Scouting 
Effectiveness 
Blue Does Not Achieve 
Surprise







MOE: FER for Blue 
 
 
 The results in Table 15 are extracted from the results 
in Tables 13 and 14 pertaining to Blue offensive/defensive 
configuration (a). What Table 15 shows is that surprise 
could mean the difference between winning and losing for a 
numerically inferior force. Specifically, if Blue does not 
achieve surprise for levels of Orange scouting 
effectiveness above 40%, it loses the salvo exchange (FER 
for Blue <1). On the other hand, if Blue manages to 
surprise just one of the two Orange TGs, it is able to 
reverse the outcome and emerge as the victor (FER for Blue 
>1). The achievement of surprise must, therefore, be a key 
consideration in the tactical planning for a naval force 
expecting to fight outnumbered.    
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The key findings and insights from the results and 
analyses presented in the preceding sections are summarized 
in the following points: 
• The critical factor for Blue’s success against a 
concentrated Orange TF is not its tactical 
disposition but its ability to outscout the 
numerically superior Orange force and deliver an 
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effective pulse of offensive firepower onto the 
Orange combatants. The key to achieving this is 
through Blue’s maritime air surveillance (MAS) 
assets which enable it to detect and effectively 
attack the Orange TF before Orange can do the same 
to Blue.  
• If Orange disperses its forces into two non-
supporting TGs, Blue should do likewise with each 
Blue TG engaging one Orange TG. Coupled with 
sufficient striking power provided by 
offensive/defensive configuration (b), this course 
of action allows Blue to achieve at least parity 
(FER for Blue >=1) in a missile salvo exchange if 
surprise cannot be achieved against Orange. On the 
other hand, if Blue operates with all four FFGs 
concentrated in one TF to engage the two Orange TGs 
sequentially, the Blue TF will be almost annihilated 
after the first salvo exchange if it fails to 
surprise any of the Orange TGs.         
• In general, the numerically inferior Blue force can 
win the battle with superior scouting and sufficient 
offensive pulsed power. Superior scouting, provided 
by its MAS assets, enables Blue to achieve tactical 
surprise and deliver firepower in a sudden, 
effective pulse.  
• To attack effectively first, the Blue force must be 




V. QUALITATIVE DISCUSSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide qualitative 
discussions pertaining to how small naval forces can fight 
and win. 
This chapter is organized into the following sections: 
B. The Battle of Savo Island: The Importance of 
Scouting and Surprise for an Outnumbered Naval Force 
C. Tactics of the Naval Battles in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War 
D. Taking Advantage of the “Missile-Sump Effect” 
E. Exploring Missile Torpedo Boats for Modern Coastal 
Navies 
F. Chapter Summary 
 Section B is a brief qualitative description of the 
World War II Battle of Savo Island fought between Allied 
and Japanese naval forces. It describes how the outnumbered 
Japanese force used surprise, effective scouting, and 
offensive pulsed power to defeat the Allied force. 
 In section C, the significant factors that contributed 
to the Israeli naval victories during the Yom Kippur War 
are identified.  
 Section D discusses how a phenomenon in modern naval 
missile warfare known as the “missile-sump effect” can be 
taken advantage of by small navies to reduce an opponent’s 
offensive combat power.  
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 The Missile Torpedo Boat or MTB can be a very 
effective littoral combat craft, especially when employed 
by small but competent coastal navies. This is explained 
and discussed in section E. 
 Section F summarizes the key points of this chapter 
and relates them to the findings and insights derived 
quantitatively in Chapter IV.   
  
B. THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND: THE IMPORTANCE OF SCOUTING 
AND SURPRISE FOR AN OUTNUMBERED NAVAL FORCE 
 The nighttime Battle of Savo Island (August 8-9 1942) 
was a naval battle in the Pacific Campaign of World War II 
fought between Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Allied 
naval forces. The battle was the first major naval 
engagement during the campaign for Guadalcanal in the 
longer Solomon Islands campaign, which lasted until January 
1943. [Ref. 4]  
 The mission of the Allied naval force was to protect 
the troop transports, supply ships, and American beachhead 
on Guadalcanal. To accomplish this, the Allied naval 
commander of the surface screening force divided his force 
into three groups. The “Southern Group” consisted of three 
cruisers and two destroyers; the “Northern Group” was also 
allocated three cruisers and two destroyers; while two 
cruisers and two destroyers made up the “Eastern Group”. In 
addition, two destroyers were deployed as pickets to 
provide early warning of any approaching Japanese ships. 
[Ref. 4]   
 The Japanese force was disposed in a single two-mile 
column and consisted of seven cruisers and a single 
destroyer [Ref. 4]. The aim of the Japanese force was to 
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destroy Allied supply ships and troop transports at 
Guadalcanal, as well as any naval opposition encountered 
there [Ref. 3]. Thus, the Japanese force was superior to 
each Allied group even though the overall Allied force 
outnumbered the Japanese force [Ref. 3].  
 Both sides utilized scouting aircraft to reconnoiter 
enemy naval ship dispositions before the battle. The 
Japanese cruiser-launched scouting aircraft detected and 
reported the southern and northern Allied groups, providing 
ample time for the Japanese commander to formulate and 
communicate his battle plan to his warships. On the other 
hand, probably due to undeveloped and inadequate command, 
control, and communications (C3) between the Allied force 
components, scouting reports from Allied Hudson 
reconnaissance aircraft were not distributed to the 
relevant Allied warships until it was too late. [Ref. 4]  
 Thus, as a result of effective scouting and C3, the 
Japanese force was able to consecutively surprise both 
Allied southern and northern groups, initiate attacks with 
massed torpedo salvoes, and then mop up with gunfire [Ref. 
3]. The battle outcome was four Allied cruisers sunk plus 
one cruiser and two destroyers damaged. The Japanese 
suffered only moderate damage to three cruisers. [Ref. 4]  
 Although many factors contributed to the Allies’ 
defeat in this battle, such as the flawed tactical 
disposition of the Allied surface screening force and 
faulty tactical C3, this battle still provides a good 
example of how an outnumbered naval force (the Japanese 
force in this case) can use effective scouting and C3 to 
achieve tactical surprise and defeat its opponent with 
sufficient offensive pulsed power.    
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C. TACTICS OF THE NAVAL BATTLES IN THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR 
WAR4 
 The 1973 Yom Kippur War witnessed the first battles in 
the history of naval warfare involving ship-versus-ship 
missile engagements and the use of electronic 
countermeasures (ECM) against missiles. The two most 
significant force-on-force naval missile battles of this 
war were the Battle of Latakia and the Battle of Baltim. 
The first battle pitted the Saar missile boats of Israel 
against the Russian-made missile boats of Syria, while the 
latter battle involved Israeli Saar boats and Egyptian 
missile boats (also of Russian origin). The Israelis were 
the undisputed victors of both battles. They emerged from 
the battles without damage to any of their missile boats 
while managing to destroy eight Arab naval vessels 
(including six of the seven Arab missile boats involved in 
the two battles) [Ref. 5]. How was such a stunning victory 
achieved?  
 The Battle of Latakia (night of October 6-7 1973) was 
the first missile battle ever in naval warfare between 
naval vessels. The Israeli task force’s objective in this 
battle was simple: draw Syrian warships out of Latakia, 
Syria’s main harbor, and sink them. There were a total of 
five vessels in the Israeli task force and they were 
disposed in two parallel columns. The battle opened with 
the detection of a Syrian picket torpedo boat and ended 
with the destruction of five Syrian vessels (the torpedo 
boat, a minesweeper, and three missile boats) and no 
Israeli losses. [Ref. 5] 
                     4 The contents of this section were extracted from a research paper 
written by the author entitled “Naval Missile Battles of the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War,” 22 October 2006.  
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 The Israeli tactics against the Syrian missile boats 
in the Latakia battle were simple in concept but not easy 
to execute: charge towards the Syrian boats to induce them 
to fire their Styx missiles, then jam and decoy the Styx 
missiles using ECM and use the Saar boats’ speed advantage 
to close within Gabriel (Israeli anti-ship cruise missile) 
range to engage and sink the Syrian missile boats (the Styx 
missile had an effective range of 24nm while the Gabriel 
missile’s effective range was only 11nm). This tactic, 
though bold, worked perfectly. Key to its success was the 
effectiveness of the Israeli ECM systems, which worked 
flawlessly. All the Styx missiles fired at the Israeli 
boats were defeated by jamming or chaff and missed their 
targets. Another equally important contributor to the 
Israelis’ success was the Gabriel missile. The Gabriel 
worked extremely well in its baptism of fire and was 
instrumental in the rapid destruction of three of the 
Syrian vessels (the other two vessels were destroyed by 
gunfire). [Ref. 5] 
 The Israelis repeated their tactics in the Battle of 
Baltim (night of October 8-9 1973) against the Egyptians. 
This time there were a total of six Israeli missile boats 
formed into three pairs moving in parallel lines across a 
broad front. Again it was a one-sided victory for the 
Israelis: three Egyptian Osa missile boats were sunk for no 
Israeli losses. Again, the Israeli ECM systems and the 
Gabriel missile performed successfully. An interesting 
feature of this battle was the Israelis’ innovative use of 
long–range chaff decoys to draw fire from the Egyptian 
missile boats and thus positively identify them as hostile 
vessels. [Ref. 5] 
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 In both battles a key factor that contributed to the 
Israelis’ overwhelming success was the concentration of 
sufficient offensive firepower, and thus striking power, in 
their missile boats. The Israeli Saar boats involved in the 
Latakia battle were equipped with a total of 26 Gabriel 
missiles, compared to only eight Styx missiles for the 
Syrians [Ref. 5]. At Baltim, the Israelis had up to 34 
Gabriels against 16 Egyptian Styxes [Ref. 5]. A plausible 
Israeli doctrine that could be deduced from this is to 
deploy and concentrate as much striking power as possible 
to overwhelm and destroy the enemy.  
 The Israelis were forced to use aggressive, innovative 
tactics. Being outranged, their tactic to charge and close 
the range to engage the Arab missile boats was a calculated 
gamble that paid off spectacularly.  
 The Israelis’ effective tactical coordination and 
command and control (C2) system also played a major role in 
their victories. They had a well-practiced tactical command 
system in which the missile boat flotilla commander, 
embarked with his command staff on a designated missile 
boat, controlled and coordinated the actions of all missile 
boats involved in an operation [Ref. 5].  
 Although they did not have any maritime air 
surveillance available during the Yom Kippur War, the 
Israelis’ missile boats expected this. They were equipped 
with passive electronic detection systems (Electronic 
Support Measures or ESM) that could reveal an enemy’s radar 
without betraying their own presence as long as the Israeli 
boats maintained radar silence [Ref. 5]. This gave the 
Israelis a scouting advantage as the Arab missile boats 
were not equipped with ESM systems.      
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 The Israelis, at both Latakia and Baltim, applied a 
sufficient pulse of striking power to defeat the enemy. 
This, in concert with effective tactical coordination and 
superior scouting, overwhelmed and thoroughly defeated the 
enemy. It is this decisive combination of offensive 
firepower, command and control, and scouting that modern 
navies must strive to achieve in order to have the best 
chance of winning any future naval battle, be it in the 
littorals or in the open oceans.  
 
D. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE “MISSILE-SUMP EFFECT”5     
 First defined by LT Jeffrey Cares in his Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Master’s thesis [Ref. 6], the 
“missile-sump effect” is a phenomenon in modern naval 
missile warfare in which some targets absorb proportionally 
more combat energy than other targets in the target 
environment. In other words, the “missile-sump effect” 
occurs when a target absorbs more than its share of hits 
when other targets are in the same environment. Cares, in 
his thesis [Ref. 6], used both simulation and analytical 
methods to demonstrate the tactical inefficiencies caused 
by the “missile-sump effect”.  
 As an illustrative example of the “missile-sump 
effect”, two radar-homing ASCMs fired at two target ships 
in close proximity (each target ship with a staying power 
of one ASCM hit per ship), with the intention of hitting 
each target ship with one ASCM, can inadvertently result in 
both ASCMs hitting the same ship. A possible cause for this 
is that the target ship that absorbed both ASCMs has, due 
                     5 The contents of this section were extracted from a research paper 
written by the author entitled “Taking Advantage of the Missile-Sump 
Effect,” 2 November 2006. 
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to poor stealth characteristics, a significantly larger 
radar cross section (RCS) for the ASCMs to home in on. In 
this case, the attacker would have “wasted” one ASCM, 
resulting in a target getting away without any damage 
whatsoever.  
 The example in the preceding paragraph, though 
fictional, shows that the “missile-sump effect” can be 
exploited to reduce an opponent’s striking power by causing 
the opponent to “waste” missile shots on less important or 
decoy targets. In this context, the decoy targets act as 
missile “absorbers” by “soaking up” a large number of 
incoming missiles, so that hits on high value units or 
major combatants are significantly reduced or even negated. 
This, however, is not a new tactical concept and has been 
employed in relatively recent naval battles. In the 1973 
Yom Kippur War, the Syrians used neutral foreign merchant 
ships anchored outside their harbors as floating “sandbags” 
behind which the Syrian missile boats could take cover 
after firing their missiles at attacking Israeli missile 
boats [Ref. 5]. A Syrian boat could thus come out from 
behind a merchant ship, fire its missiles, and then rapidly 
dodge behind another merchantman. This tactic proved rather 
effective for the Syrians as the Israelis could not lock on 
to the Syrian boats long enough to fire their semi-active 
radar-homing Gabriel missiles effectively. In fact, the 
Israelis did not score any confirmed hits on Syrian boats 
employing this tactic, but ended up hitting and sinking 
some neutral freighters instead [Ref. 5]. 
 Admiral Woodward, the British Battle Group Commander 
during the 1982 Falklands War, was in a way taking 
advantage of the “missile-sump effect” when he placed large 
cargo ships, such as the Atlantic Conveyor, on the threat 
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axis between his aircraft carriers and his outer screen. In 
this case, the Atlantic Conveyor absorbed both Exocet ASCMs 
that could have hit the British aircraft carrier HMS Hermes 
had the Atlantic Conveyor not been acting as the carrier’s 
de facto missile shield. Although the Atlantic Conveyor was 
lost, together with the important cargo on board, the loss 
of a British carrier (the British aircraft carriers were 
their center of gravity) was averted. [Refs. 2 and 7] 
 In the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, both the Iranians and 
Iraqis used simple radar reflectors fixed on floating buoys 
as decoy targets to lure and absorb radar-homing ASCMs 
[Ref. 8]. It has been claimed that some of these floating 
decoys were hit repeatedly by ASCMs and 90% of the Exocets 
fired during the war hit buoys with radar reflectors on 
them instead of actual ships [Ref. 8]. This was possibly 
the most cost-effective method that has been used in actual 
combat to take advantage of the “missile-sump effect”.  
 It is in the littoral environment, in particular, that 
the “missile-sump effect” can be put to good use by a 
defending navy. Small navies operating in narrow seas 
littered with numerous islands or islets (the Aegean Sea 
and the Malacca Straits are two good examples) can make 
full use of their geographical environment coupled with the 
“missile-sump effect” to counter an aggressor navy. 
Decommissioned naval vessels or old merchant ships can be 
stripped of their equipment and fitted with simple radar 
reflectors to act as cheap decoy targets and missile 
“absorbers”. Decommissioned amphibious warfare ships, for 
example, can be used as they make good missile “absorbers” 
due to their large size. These decoys can be towed to 
strategic choke points among island groups where they can 
act as floating “sandbags”. The defender’s small fast 
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attack missile craft can use these decoys as cover from 
which they can launch missile strikes at the attacker’s 
ships. There is a very good chance that any return missile 
salvo from the attacker will be attracted to the larger RCS 
of the floating decoys, with the result that the decoys 
absorb a large proportion of or hopefully all the missiles 
meant for the defender’s missile craft. This “missile-sump 
effect” “wastes” the attacker’s missiles and thus erodes 
the attacker’s striking power. From the defender’s 
perspective, this is a very cost-effective tactic since the 
decoys are cheap and expendable. A point to note is that 
this tactic works only if the attacker’s ships are armed 
predominantly with radar-homing missiles that can be 
“lured” by the larger RCS of the floating decoys. (Most 
modern ASCMs use radar seekers to home in on their targets 
so this is not yet a major concern.) 
 A possible variation of the above concept would be to 
employ remotely controlled decoy ships instead of static 
floating decoy ships. The decoy ships could be controlled 
by a master control ship or aircraft. Though slightly more 
expensive (due to the procurement and retrofitting of 
remote-control devices), this makes the decoy ships more 
“credible” in the sense that they will be actual moving 
ships. Fast attack missile craft could move together with 
such remote-control decoy ships, using them as mobile 
missile shields. Besides fitting the remote-control decoy 
ships with simple radar reflectors, an electronic warfare 
device called the traveling wave tube (TWT) could also be 
used. The TWT [Ref. 9] functions by amplifying received 
missile radar signals and transmitting them back to the 
missile. The re-transmitted signals appear very strong to 
the missile, thus simulating a much bigger target. This has 
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the effect of further increasing the probability that an 
incoming ASCM is “absorbed” by the decoy ship. The idea of 
employing the TWT to decoy ASCMs was pioneered by the 
British during the Falklands War when TWT-equipped Royal 
Navy helicopters were used as mobile missile decoys [Ref. 
8]. A similar idea was also used by Tom Clancy in his best-
selling fictional military techno-thriller “Red Storm 
Rising” [Ref. 10].    
 The “missile-sump effect” can, therefore, be taken 
advantage of, especially by small navies operating in 
littoral environments, in innovative ways to reduce an 
opponent’s striking power by using decoys to “absorb” a 
large proportion (or even all) of his offensive missiles. 
The “missile-sump effect” can have a significant influence 
on modern naval missile warfare and it should be an 
important consideration in tactical planning and resource 
acquisition (e.g., acquisition of remote-control decoy 
ships). The historical examples cited in this section have 
amply demonstrated its tactical importance. 
 It would probably be appropriate to point out here, as 
a final note to this section, that the “missile-sump 
effect” is difficult to model using the Modified Salvo 
Model (or Hughes’ Salvo Model) due to its inherent 
assumption (for mathematical simplicity and analytical 
clarity) that incoming ASCMs are uniformly distributed over 
all targets. Although this will rarely happen in reality 







Gaussian distribution), the Modified Salvo Model suffices 
for the exploratory analyses conducted for the purposes of 
this thesis.6     
 
E. EXPLORING MISSILE TORPEDO BOATS FOR MODERN COASTAL 
NAVIES7 
 After the German invasion of Norway (April 1940) 
during World War II, officers and men of the Royal 
Norwegian Navy became heavily involved in the activities of 
the Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) of the Royal Navy’s Coastal 
Forces. The Norwegians were, in fact, allocated their own 
MTB flotilla (based in the Shetland Islands in England) 
equipped with the British Fairmile D Class MTB (also called 
“Dog Boats”). The Norwegian MTB flotilla eventually 
consisted of 12 “Dog Boats”. Taking advantage of their 
knowledge of the unique aspects of the Norwegian littoral 
environment (consisting of fjords and narrow inlets among 
numerous islands), the Norwegian “Dog Boats” were very 
effectively used against German coastal convoys in so-
called “lurking operations”. In such operations, the 
Norwegian “Dog Boats”, after sailing to Norway from their 
operating base in England, would find a good position to 
stalk the enemy close to the shore or an island, so as to 
be in the shadow of the land. Once alongside, the “Dog 
Boats” were camouflaged and would lie in wait for an 
opportunity to ambush an enemy convoy. The effectiveness of 
                     6 It should be noted that in his Naval Postgraduate School Master’s 
Thesis titled “Using Hughes’ Salvo Model to Examine Ship 
Characteristics in Surface Warfare,” September 2004, Kevin G. Haug used 
Hughes’ Salvo Model, while assuming a Polya distribution of shots, to 
show that the bonus gained by attaining perfect information is a 
significant edge, and the hazard of failing to deny the enemy the same.  
7 The contents of this section were extracted from a research paper 
written by the author entitled “Missile Torpedo Boats for Modern 
Littoral Warfare,” 21 November 2006.  
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this tactic was demonstrated by the fact that a total of 26 
enemy vessels were definitely sunk and four enemy aircraft 
were shot down while no Norwegian “Dog Boat” was lost in 
actual combat. [Ref. 11] 
 At the end of World War II, the Norwegian “Dog Boats” 
returned to Norway to operate (in peacetime) for the next 
few years from their homeland [Ref. 11]. These boats were 
the nucleus of the post-war Norwegian Navy’s coastal combat 
force, which was to consist of successive classes of 
Norwegian-designed motor torpedo boats such as the Rapp 
[Ref. 12] and Tjeld [Ref. 13] classes. Subsequently during 
the Cold War, the Royal Norwegian Navy (as part of NATO) 
was optimized for sea denial in Norwegian coastal waters, 
in order to make an invasion from the sea as difficult and 
costly as possible [Ref. 14]. With that mission in mind, 
the Norwegian Navy was predominantly made up of fast attack 
craft armed with ASCMs, anti-ship torpedoes, and medium-
caliber guns. These craft were classified by the Norwegians 
as Missile Torpedo Boats [Ref. 14] and thus shared the same 
acronym (MTB) as their predecessor, the World War II Motor 
Torpedo Boat. Even after the Cold War and until today the 
Norwegian Navy has retained the Missile Torpedo Boat within 
its surface combatant inventory [Ref. 14].  
 The Missile Torpedo Boat is certainly not obsolete in 
modern naval warfare and, in fact, might prove to be one of 
the most lethal combatants in modern littoral warfare. 
Although modern ASCMs, on the average, have significantly 
greater effective ranges than most anti-ship torpedoes, 
their effectiveness can be seriously reduced within 
littoral environments. The following three points highlight 
some shortcomings of many modern ASCMs when used in the 
littorals: 
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• Most modern ASCMs use active radar seekers to home in 
on their targets. However, the radar clutter caused by 
the coastline, islands and islets, and neutral 
shipping (features that are common in the littorals) 
would pose difficulties for the active radar seeker on 
an ASCM to home in on the correct target.  
• ASCMs equipped with active radar seekers can be 
decoyed simply by mounting simple radar reflectors on 
large, decommissioned ships acting as decoy targets 
and missile “absorbers” (as discussed in the preceding 
section of this chapter).  
• Ship-to-ship identification in littoral environments 
is usually accomplished through electro-optic sensors 
(infra-red sensors at night) or visually. Depending on 
the size of the target and environmental conditions, 
identification ranges in the littorals are usually 
relatively short, probably around 2-5nm for a fast 
attack craft or corvette-sized target or 7-8nm for a 
frigate-sized target. Although small ship-launched 
UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) can be used to extend 
a warship’s identification range, weather conditions 
often preclude their employment. Most, if not all, 
ship-launched ASCMs have a minimum range within which 
they are ineffective. The minimum range for a ship-
launched ASCM depends on the length of its boost phase 
after launch and generally varies from about 2nm to 
5nm. Hence, there would be situations in which ASCMs, 
even those with electro-optic or infra-red seekers 
(which are arguably more effective than active radar 
seekers in littoral environments), are ineffective due 
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to short target identification ranges (especially at 
night or in bad weather conditions).  
  
 Anti-ship torpedoes, therefore, can be used to plug 
the gaps caused by the abovementioned shortcomings of 
ASCMs. Torpedoes are less constrained by minimum ranges and 
cannot be “fooled” by radar clutter or radar decoys. 
Furthermore, torpedoes are more destructive than ASCMs 
since they hit a ship below its waterline, in the screws, 
or under its keel, thus causing flooding, immobility, or 
most effective of all, breaking a ship’s back.  
 Although it can be argued that acoustic-homing 
torpedoes might not be effective amidst the cacophony of 
background noises in the littoral underwater environment, 
this problem can be solved to a certain extent by using 
wire-guided torpedoes which can be guided by an operator 
all the way from the launch platform to the target. In 
fact, even unguided straight-running torpedoes can be 
employed since these torpedoes are not equipped with 
seekers and simply proceed on the course along which they 
are aimed. These straight-runners, therefore, cannot be 
countered by noise-makers or acoustic jammers. Though 
inherently less accurate than homing torpedoes, the short 
engagement ranges in the littorals and modern fire control 
systems can still ensure a high probability of hit for a 
salvo of straight-running torpedoes.  
 In conclusion, it must be emphasized that the purpose 
of this section is not to “promote” the use of ship-
launched anti-ship torpedoes in littoral combat, but to 
make the point that naval combatants armed with 
complementary anti-ship pulse weapons (torpedoes and 
missiles) can be effectively used as littoral combat craft. 
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The Missile Torpedo Boat is a fine example of such a 
combatant. It is nimble and maneuverable, and its ASCMs can 
be used in longer-range engagements in which the target or 
targets can be clearly distinguished from the background 
clutter while its torpedoes can be employed in situations 
in which ASCMs are ineffective. Thus, the Missile Torpedo 
Boat is a viable platform option that can be considered by 
modern coastal navies.  
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 Sections B and C of this chapter provide historical 
examples of how outnumbered naval forces of a small navy 
have defeated their opponents through the use of superior 
and effective scouting and the application of sufficient 
offensive firepower. Section B demonstrates the importance 
of achieving surprise for a numerically inferior naval 
force. Section C shows how the small Israeli Navy used 
bold, innovative but risky tactics to overcome their 
tactical limitations and achieve victory. These examples 
qualitatively reinforce the key findings and insights in 
Chapter IV that were derived quantitatively using the 
Modified Salvo Model.    
 Section D discusses how modern coastal navies can 
innovatively take advantage of tactical phenomenon like the 
“missile-sump effect” to reduce an opponent’s striking 
power. Section E suggests that the Missile Torpedo Boat can 
play an effective role in modern littoral warfare, 
especially when employed by competent coastal navies. The 
key points are two: first, that modern small navies must 
strive to be innovative in tactical planning as well as in 
force structuring. Second, that the results of quantitative  
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analysis must be combined with considerations no combat 
model can fully account for in order to construct the best 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
 In this thesis, the Modified Salvo Model (a modified 
version of Hughes’ Salvo Model) was developed to analyze 
quantitatively how the missile frigates of a small, but 
modern, littoral navy (Blue Navy) should be tactically 
disposed against its numerically superior but 
technologically inferior adversary (Orange Navy). 
Significant tactical factors and insights that are crucial 
to the success of small navies when fighting outnumbered 
were also identified in the analysis. Examples of past 
naval battles that illustrate the practical importance of 
the identified factors are then presented to qualitatively 
support the quantitative findings. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
 1. Tactical Dispositions 
 How the outnumbered Blue Navy should be tactically 
disposed depends, in part, on the tactical disposition 
adopted by its Orange Navy opponent. Insofar as the Orange 
Navy chooses to disperse its forces into two non-supporting 
task groups, the Blue Navy should do likewise so as to 
ensure at least a parity outcome (in terms of FER) in the 
event it cannot surprise Orange. A precondition for Blue to 
disperse its forces is the ability of its dispersed units 
to apply sufficient pulsed power. This implies that Blue 
must put greater emphasis on the amount of offensive 
firepower on board its missile frigates while still 
maintaining sufficient defensive capability.   
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 If Orange favors concentration instead, Blue’s 
tactical disposition becomes secondary to its scouting 
advantage. It is more important that Blue deploys its 
maritime air surveillance assets wisely in order to detect 
the Orange force and deliver sufficient offensive power to 
attack it effectively before Orange can do likewise. The 
achievement of an effective first strike might be by 
outranging the enemy weapons, by concealment in coastal 
clutter, or by causing a mal-distribution of enemy ASCMs, 
but in every case first detection and targeting is key to 
battle victory.    
 The above findings lead to the general conclusion that 
dispersal for stealthy surprise attack is the preferred 
tactic for a numerically inferior naval force. The Blue 
Navy is better off dispersing its combatants in the face of 
Orange’s numerical superiority. Orange, therefore, has to 
detect and engage the dispersed Blue task groups 
individually, making simultaneous action against all of 
them difficult if not impossible. Blue’s superior scouting 
capability, on the other hand, makes it possible to 
simultaneously extend its information gathering network to 
detect all Orange forces, and allows the dispersed Blue 
units to deliver a coordinated missile strike on Orange.  
 Assuming Orange, knowing that its individual units are 
weak in defensive power, would most probably adopt the 
traditional tactic of concentrating or massing its forces 
to support one another defensively, the attainment of 
surprise and the delivery of overwhelming striking power 
become even more critical for Blue. To achieve surprise and 
attack effectively first, Blue must put unstinting emphasis 
on superior scouting, be risk-prone and be willing to use 
aggressive and innovative tactics.  
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 2. Tactical Insights 
 The preceding sub-section presents conclusions 
pertaining to the tactical disposition of the Blue Navy. 
Equally important are the tactical insights inferred from 
the analysis conducted in this thesis. These are summed up 
below. 
• Blue’s numerical inferiority dictates that it should 
not engage in a force-on-force missile salvo 
exchange with Orange. Unless Orange suffers a severe 
degradation in targeting effectiveness or Blue 
increases its defensive power to a level 
significantly above that considered in this thesis, 
the Blue Navy in this thesis cannot prevail in an 
exchange of salvos.  
• The consequence of being surprised is drastic for 
both Blue and Orange because either side has the 
potential to deliver offensive firepower in a sudden 
effective pulse. The possibility of surprise and 
swift destruction is even more likely to arise in 
littoral waters than in the open ocean.  
• An important implication of the above conclusions is 
that the smaller Blue Navy must be able to detect, 
track, target, and attack effectively while avoiding 
similar tactical success by the Orange units. First 
detection, tracking, and targeting can be achieved 
by capable scouting platforms such as long-endurance 
maritime surveillance aircraft or UAVs (Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles). An adequate number of such 
platforms must be provided to ensure continuous 
coverage of the area of operations. The delivery of 
an effective attack requires that the ASCM salvo 
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size of the small number of Blue combatants be large 
enough to produce a sufficient pulse of striking 
power. Given that the size of Blue’s force is fixed, 
which precludes a distribution of firepower amongst 
more combatants, Blue can only overcome this 
limitation by increasing the ASCM load of its 
frigates to the maximum possible extent while still 
retaining adequate defensive power. To put it in 
another way, offensive firepower must be emphasized 
to compensate for small force size.     
• An important prerequisite for a small navy or naval 
force to operate in a dispersed fashion is an 
effective command, control, and communications (C3) 
system. An effective C3 system allows a dispersed 
naval force to deliver a coordinated missile strike 
that is concentrated in both time and space.      
• As important as superior scouting, effective C3, and 
sufficient striking power are, a small navy must 
also be able to catch its enemy with a temporary 
vulnerability and exploit it to achieve surprise. 
This requires some combination of initiative, 
willingness to act on an estimate of enemy 
intentions, and the ability to implement bold, 
innovative tactics. These attributes have all been 
demonstrated by small, but victorious, naval forces 
in the history of naval warfare. The World War II 
Battle of Savo Island and the naval missile battles 
during the Yom Kippur War provide two excellent 
examples.  
• The “missile-sump effect” is an important tactical 
phenomenon in modern naval missile warfare and it 
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offers a cost-effective way for a small navy to even 
out the odds by reducing or “wasting” a stronger 
opponent’s striking power.   
• Most small navies operate in the littorals and must 
possess combat craft that are well-equipped for the 
unique characteristics of their respective operating 
environments. The selection or design of the 
appropriate type of littoral combatant therefore 
requires innovative and unconventional thinking on 
the part of force planners.     
  
C. ENDNOTE       
 This thesis ends with the following quotes from 
Captain USN(Retired) Wayne Hughes as written in his book 
Fleet Tactics And Coastal Combat [Ref. 2].  
 
 “First application of effective firepower is the 
foremost tactical aim.” 
    - Captain USN(Retired) Wayne Hughes 
 
 “To attack effectively first, an inferior force must 
overcome its limitations by some combination of initiative 
and surprise.” 
    - Captain USN(Retired) Wayne Hughes     
 
 “Applying sufficient pulsed power (single large 
salvoes), a considerably inferior force can win the battle 
with superior scouting or C2. The firepower of the inferior 
force must be sufficient.”  
    - Captain USN(Retired) Wayne Hughes     
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 This thesis has shown, both analytically and through 
historical examples, the validity of these three statements 
that planners and tacticians of modern, small navies would 





APPENDIX A: A PROPOSED STAYING POWER MODEL8 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 A study by the Brookings Institution asserts that the 
number of hits required to put a ship out of action (OOA) 
can be related to the length of the ship. This study also 
concluded that a hit by one large warhead would 
incapacitate a modern warship up to 300 feet long, and 
another similar warhead is required for every additional 
100 feet. [Ref. 2] 
 
 Using the findings from the Brookings study, this 
appendix proposes a simple “back of the envelope” 
deterministic staying power model for computing the number 
of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) of a given warhead 
weight required to put a warship of a given length OOA.  
 
B. PROPOSED STAYING POWER MODEL 
 The proposed model is expressed in the form of an IF 
ELSE statement as presented below. 
 
   IF L <= (z/w)*300 
   N = 1; 
     ELSE     




                     8 The contents of this appendix were extracted from a research paper 
written by the author entitled “A Proposed Model to Compute the Number 
of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles Required to Put a Warship Out of Action,” 
1 November 2006. 
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L = length (in feet) of warship; 
 
z = warhead weight (in pounds) of ASCM; 
 
w = warhead weight (in pounds) of an ASCM such that a hit 
 by such an ASCM would incapacitate a modern warship up 
 to 300 feet long, and another similar ASCM is required 
 for every additional 100 feet;   
 
N = number of ASCMs required to put the given warship OOA. 
 
 Assuming that w = 363 pounds (warhead weight of an 
Exocet ASCM), computations using the above model show that 
3 Exocets are required to put a warship 500 feet in length 
(approximate length of a Sovremenny class DDG) OOA while 
only 1.7 Harpoon ASCMs (Harpoon ASCM warhead weight = 488 
pounds) are required to put the same warship OOA. This 
makes intuitive sense since the Harpoon ASCM has a 
significantly larger warhead weight compared to the Exocet 
and thus fewer Harpoons are required to put the same 
warship OOA.9  
  
C. REMARKS 
 Although the above model can be used to compute a 
rough estimate of the staying power of a warship in terms 
of the number of hits from a particular type of ASCM, it is 
important to bear in mind that this model was not developed 
to draw any firm conclusions about warship staying power. 
Neither was this model developed to derive precise warship 
vulnerability figures for engineering purposes. Its main 
                     9 The Exocet ASCM and Harpoon ASCM warhead weights and the length of 
the Sovremenny class DDG were obtained from Jane’s Fighting Ships.  
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purpose is simply to produce credible estimates of warship 
staying power that can be used as inputs for analytical 
combat models that are used to gain insights into naval 
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APPENDIX B: BAR CHARTS OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS IN 
CHAPTER IV 
This appendix provides bar charts of the quantitative 
results for all excursions presented in Chapter IV. For 
excursions in which the scouting effectiveness of either 
the Blue or Orange force is varied, only the bar charts for 
scouting effectiveness levels of 40%, 70%, and 100% are 
presented. This makes the charts less cluttered and more 
readable while still retaining the key information.  
 
A. BAR CHARTS OF EXCURSION A RESULTS 
 
 Figure 2. Bar Chart of Excursion A1 Results 
 
Excursion A1: 1 Blue TF (4 FFG) vs 1 Orange TF 
(12 missile corvettes) 


























A Blue Config (a):
ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Pow er = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Pow er = 4
Orange defensive 
readiness fixed at 
100%
 











 Figure 3. Bar Chart of Excursion A2 Results 
 
Excursion A2: 1 Orange TF (12 missile corvettes) 
vs 1 Blue TF (4 FFG) 

























ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Pow er = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Pow er = 4
Blue defensive 
readiness fixed at 
100%
 
Values in bar chart are rounded to nearest percent. 
 
 
 Figure 4. Bar Chart of Excursion A3 Results 
Excursion A3: 1 Blue TF (4 FFG) vs 1 Orange TF 
(12 missile corvettes) 































ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Pow er = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Pow er = 4
Both sides' defensive 
readiness f ixed at 
100%.
Blue scouting 
effectiveness f ixed at 
100%.
 








B. BAR CHARTS OF EXCURSION B RESULTS 
 
 Figure 5. Bar Chart of Excursion B1 Results 
Excursion B1: "Active" Blue TG (2 FFG) Exchanges 
Salvos with Orange TF (12 missile corvettes) while 






























ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Pow er = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Pow er = 4
Both sides' defensive 
readiness f ixed at 
100%.
Blue scouting 
effectiveness f ixed at 
100%.
 




 Figure 6. Bar Chart of Excursion B2 Results 
    

































e Blue Config (a):
ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Power = 4
 





C. BAR CHARTS OF EXCURSION C RESULTS  
 
 Figure 7. Bar Chart of Excursion C1 Results for Blue  
 Offensive/Defensive Configuration (a) 
    
Excursion C1: Salvo Exchange betw Blue TF (4 
FFG) vs 1 Orange TG (6 missile corvettes)
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A # of Blue FFGs 
OOA
# of Orange Missile 
Corvettes OOA
Both sides' scouting 
effectiveness & 
defensive readiness 
f ixed at 100%.
OOA = Out of Action
 
Blue Offensive/Defensive Configuration (a): ASCM Salvo Size 
= 8; Defensive Power = 6 
 
 
 Figure 8. Bar Chart of Excursion C1 Results for Blue  
 Offensive/Defensive Configuration (b) 
    
Excursion C1: Salvo Exchange betw Blue TF (4 
FFG) vs 1 Orange TG (6 missile corvettes)
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A # of Blue FFGs 
OOA
# of Orange Missile 
Corvettes OOA
Both sides' scouting 
effectiveness & 
defensive readiness 
f ixed at 100%.
OOA = Out of Action
 
Blue Offensive/Defensive Configuration (b): ASCM Salvo Size 




 Figure 9. Bar Chart of Excursion C2 Results 
Excursion C2: 1 Blue TF (4 FFG) vs 2 Dispersed 
Orange TGs (6 missile corvettes each). Blue TF 






































ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Pow er = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size =
12
Defensive Pow er = 4
Both sides' defensive 
readiness f ixed at 
100% for all TGs.
Blue scouting 
effectiveness f ixed at 
100%.
 






























D BAR CHARTS OF EXCURSION D RESULTS 
 
 Figure 10. Bar Chart of Excursion D1 Results 
    
Excursion D1: 2 Dispersed Blue TGs (2 FFG each) 
vs 2 Dispersed Orange TGs (6 missile corvettes 
































ASCM Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Power = 4
Both sides' defensive 
readiness f ixed at 
100% for all TGs.
Blue scouting 
effectiveness f ixed at 
100% for all TGs.
 




 Figure 11. Bar Chart of Excursion D2 Results 
    
Excursion D2: 2 Dispersed Blue TGs (2 FFG each) 
vs 2 Dispersed Orange TGs (6 missile corvettes 



































ASCM  Salvo Size = 8
Defensive Power = 6
Blue Config (b):
ASCM  Salvo Size = 12
Defensive Power = 4
Both sides' defensive 
readiness f ixed at 
100% for all TGs.
Blue scouting 
effectiveness f ixed at 
100% for all TGs.
 






Figure 12. Bar Chart to Show Advantage for Blue if it 
Manages to Surprise 1 Orange TG in Excursion D 
         
Excursion D: Blue Has Definite Advantage if it Manages to 




































Both sides' defensive 
readiness f ixed at 100% 
for all TGs.
Blue scouting 
effectiveness f ixed at 
100% for all TGs.
Blue config (a) is used.
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